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The theory of comparative institutional advantage allocates substantive
decisionmaking between courts and legislatures according to their relative
ability to make truly representative decisions.' According to utilitarian
democratic theory, the only acceptable basis for social choice among com-
peting values is the number and intensity of popular preferences. Because
the legislature is much better equipped to register popular values than
courts, the legislature is presumptively the superior decisionmaker.2 The
legislature, however, is never a perfect representational institution.3 Some-
times courts can better reconstruct the results of a truly representational
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1. See Komesar, In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A Comparative Institutional
Alternative, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1350 (1981) (applying comparative institutional analysis to various
institutions and issues); Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously A Strategy for the Construction of
Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CI. L. REV. (1984) (forthcoming) (comparing judiciary to legislature
as reviewer of legislative action). Unlike some theories of judicial review that depend upon "natural"
rights, comparative institutional advantage is compatible with the radical separation of law from
morals essential to liberal democracies. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs 76-80, 85-88
(1975).
2. Cf. Berns, Judicial Review and the Rights and Laws of Nature, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 49, 64,
74 (discussing Locke's and Pufendorf's arguments giving primacy to legislation).
3. See D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 263-70 (1979) (pointing out difficulties of redistributional
questions in democratic legislatures under positivist, contractarian theories); see also Michelman, Uni-
versal Resident Suffrage: A Liberal Defense, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1581, 1584-88 (1982) (all distribu-
tions of political rights are also distributions of economic wealth).
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process. Comparative institutional advantage holds that judicial review is
proper in such cases. By refusing to act unless action is needed to increase
representativeness, the use of comparative institutionalism turns the coun-
termajoritarian difficulty4 on its head: Courts will act only when they are
more democratic than legislatures.
Because the legislative process is subject to a number of predictable and
patterned flaws, the scope of the representational flaws of legislatures is
not necessarily small. First, there is de jure or de facto exclusion; insular
minorities may be locked out of the legislative process so that their prefer-
ences do not register.5 Among represented interests, there is the tyranny of
the majority-when weak preferences of a bare majority may dominate
strong preferences of a minority6-or the tyranny of the minority-when
strong preferences of a special interest may overwhelm even stronger, but
diffuse, preferences of a majority.7 Indeed, almost all important provisions
of the Constitution can be seen as examples of concern about representa-
tional failure (i.e., as expressing institutional distrust).8 Comparative in-
stitutional advantage can therefore become a theoretically grounded
method of interpretivism9 that resolves the tension between textual and
structural methods of interpreting the Constitution.
The existence of representational flaws in the legislature does not by
itself justify review. For a court to intervene, the court must be able to
correct the legislative flaw and must address other issues in the same case,
some of which the legislature is clearly better able to decide. Even when
legislatures are seriously flawed, courts may be worse-as the political
(nonracial) gerrymandering left over after the reapportionment decisions
perhaps suggests.1" Conversely, legislatures may be adequate while courts
4. A. BICKEI., THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962) (describing difficulty of establish-
ing constitutional authority for judicial review of legislative decisions).
5. This is the premise of the famous Carolene Products footnote. United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See generally Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the
Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982) (historical analysis of footnote 4 of Carolene
Products and countermajoritarian difficulty).
6. This may be the problem with all the true "moralisms," and the justification for protecting
erotic material as free speech. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTIONAL LAW § 12-16, at 661-62
(1978) (describing Supreme Court's standards in obscenity cases).
7. This is one way to interpret the problem both in Carolene Products and the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). For a lucid explanation of the "two tyrannies" as poles of a
continuum, see Komesar, Housing, Zoning, and the Public Interest, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 218,
219-21 (B. Weisbrod ed. 1978).
8. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTitUST 87-104 (1980) (Constitution concerned with rein-
forcing representation).
9. I tend to agree with Professor Michaels that all of the prevailing theories of constitutional
interpretation are interpretations of the meaning of the text and intentions of the Framers, but that it
is nonetheless possible to identify arguments which are not interpretations of, but, in effect, rejections
of, the Constitution. See Michaels, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (Book Review), 61
TEX. L. REv. 765, 772-76 (1982).
10. See Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653 (1983).
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are superior, as with procedural due process.11 Courts may be the supe-
rior institution for deciding one aspect of a case but inferior at resolving
another, as when advancing minority rights requires large-scale
administration.
1 2
Rebell and Block's Educational Policy Making and the Courts is an
empirical study dominated by two types of concerns about comparative
institutional advantage. First, the book asks a series of questions about
general judicial competence in cases affecting educational policy. Do
courts decide cases according to "principle," the supposed jurisprudential
basis for their authority?13 Are judges able to find facts sufficiently well to
deal with policy questions?14 Can courts represent all the interests in-
volved in educational policy cases?15 Finally, can they design effective and
legitimate remedies?" Each question is designed to test assertions of the
critique of judicial activism that raises doubts about the element of judicial
capacity. The authors answer each question in favor of the competence of
courts to decide educational policy.
Rebell and Block also explore the specific relative competencies of
courts and legislatures in representing racial minorities' interests in educa-
tional policy. In addition to a statistical survey of sixty-five federal "trial
court proceedings" concluded between 1970 and 1977,'7 the book contains
two extensive case studies comparing judicial and legislative treatment of
similar educational issues."' On the issue of affirmative action in hiring,19
minorities in New York State had some success in the federal courts but
little in the state legislature.20 In contrast, minorities in Colorado achieved
in the state legislature21 what they were abruptly denied in the federal
courts-a victory on the issue of bilingual/bicultural education.22 What
the authors conclude from these fascinating case studies is unclear, but the
question raised is obvious: If courts are the champions of minorities, why
11. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1982) ("[T]he degree of proof required in a
particular type of proceeding 'is the kind of question which has traditionally been left to the judiciary
to resolve."') (citation omitted).
12. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-45 (1974). The Court's willingness to confront
problems of administration is inevitably affected by its willingness to represent minorities against the
legislative status quo. See infra pp. 776-77; see also Clune, Wealth Discrimination in School Finance,
68 Nw. U.L. REv. 651, 664-75 (1973) (discussing difficulties of identifying minority interests in
school financing cases).
13. M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE COURTS 23-43 (1982)
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did courts grant minorities only a single, incomplete victory in the two
cases studied?2"
The book does not explain how to integrate its two methods of institu-
tional comparison. The exploration of general judicial competence is not
systematically related to that of specific comparative judicial competence,
though both explorations use an educational data base and address the
rights of racial minorities or cultural and political nonconformists.24 This
failure of integration makes both comparative frameworks seem incom-
plete. Abstract judicial capacity divorced from substantive issues makes no
sense: It is as if the question were simply an heuristic exchange about
whether courts or legislatures are the better institutions to "make policy."
And so we are left wondering why both courts and legislatures have
mixed success in representing minority interests.
2 5
In the rest of this Review, I would like to recast the Rebell and Block
book in a sharper comparative institutional framework which combines
generic capacity questions with questions concerning capacity on the spe-
cific substantive issue of representing racial minorities. It seems to me that
much of the intriguing content of the book stems from the picture of
courts fulfilling two distinct, somewhat opposed roles in deciding cases
brought by racial minorities and non-conformists. One role is legislative
correction, identifying and compensating for imperfection in the legislative
process. The other is judicial correction, compensating for legislative cor-
23. Although the results of the New York litigation are difficult to summarize because the rele-
vant judicial and administrative decisions spanned eight years, pp. 79-85 (overview of litigation), the
minorities involved had obtained significant concessions until the Second Circuit order terminating
jurisdiction put the case in limbo. See infra pp. 776-77. In Colorado, the court flatly denied the
plaintiffs' request for bilingual/bicultural education and affirmative action in educational hirings.
Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist., 408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1975).
24. Rebell and Block define non-conformists as persons challenging governmental actions alleg-
edly "directed against unconventional political, religious, or cultural beliefs or practices." P. 36.
25. A brief synthesis of the two perspectives does appear at the end of the book:
[T]he difficulties courts have encountered in effectuating relief under circumstances of en-
trenched resistance should not be considered a criticism of the capability of judicial institutions,
per se. Comparatively speaking, in such situations courts experience substantially the same
problems as would any governmental agency attempting such thoroughgoing systemwide re-
forms. (In many of the instances, the courts became involved precisely because the other
branches are unable or unwilling to handle such confrontational issues.) Our findings have
shown that in situations where the parties (and the public) are inclined to cooperate (or at
least to avoid strong resistance), courts are capable of fashioning effective relief. Thus, in the
areas of remedies, as in the area of fact-finding and interest representation, many of the argu-
ments that have been used to criticize judicial capabilities are, we believe, more reflective of the
social, political, and technical characteristics of particular public policy controversies than of
any comparative judicial incapacity to deal with those issues.
P. 214. This passage is consistent with a modern comparative institutional framework: Courts and
legislatures sometimes differ in their capacities to solve different substantive issues; substantive diffi-
culties arise from social and political realities rather than legal categories; identification of a legislative
flaw (or strength) is not conclusive because it is not comparative. The only essential element of a
complete analysis not mentioned is that a single case may involve many issues, and courts may have a
comparative advantage in resolving some issues and a comparative disadvantage in others.
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rection (a recorrection, if you will): Having taken a problem away from
the legislature to correct a flaw in the legislative process, courts strive to
restore the political process in the parts of the case where political repre-
sentation is appropriate. Courts are visibly concerned with their obvious
relative disadvantage in deciding representational issues.
Part I of this Review concerns legislative correction; Part II, judicial
correction. In both parts, I argue that comparative institutional analysis
serves both a positive and a normative function. Positively, the book shows
courts fulfulling the roles suggested for them by comparative institutional
analysis; normatively, the theory allows us to identify lapses from the
proper judicial role. I conclude with a discussion of the systemic limits to
judicial activism implied by comparative institutional analysis.
I. LEGISLATIVE CORRECTION: A COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
A. Courts as Democracy for Minorities: Need and Capacity
The book's best evidence of minority underrepresentation in the legisla-
ture comes from the case study of the New York legislature's reaction to
claims that minority educators were unfairly harmed by layoffs of school
personnel:
None of the legislators (and, indeed, none of the interest groups in-
volved) ever disputed the basic claim that recently hired minority
teachers were disproportionately affected by the layoffs. But the mi-
nority claims were not viewed as principle issues entitled to preemi-
nent consideration. Rather, they were seen as one legitimate interest
to be weighted [sic] against other legitimate and competing policy
claims in reaching a final workable (or at least politically acceptable)
solution.26
Weighing interests against each other is the function of a truly repre-
sentative legislature. Comparative institutional analysis suggests reformu-
lating the problem as one of representational bias. In the context of dis-
criminatory employment practices, past discrimination has created a large
group of people (securely employed whites) with a powerful interest in
the status quo. The intensity of preferences in favor of this status quo
probably is strong enough to outweigh the intensity of preferences in favor
of equal employment opportunity. Minorities need "preeminent" consid-
eration now because of subordinate consideration in the past. Thus, com-
parative institutional analysis suggests this historically complex (yet intui-
tively plausible) justification for affirmative action: Contemporary
26. P. 141.
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legislative power may be unrepresentative because it reflects past
discrimination.
If legislatures are incapable of giving fair weight to minority prefer-
ences, how is it possible to explain minority legislative victories? One of
the book's most interesting findings is the success in the Colorado legisla-
ture of a bill mandating bilingual/bicultural education, a bill that passed
in the face of the identical conservative political opposition that plagued
the plaintiffs in a federal court case in Colorado also seeking bilingual/
bicultural education.27 The authors suggest several explanations: Two
prominent Chicano legislators adopted the bill as a first priority;2" the
more experimentally minded legislature was more accepting of novel edu-
cational theories;29 the pro-education aspects of bilingualism/biculturalism
emerged more readily in the legislature than did the conservative "anti-
rights" plank.30
A comparative institutional perspective suggests two explanations. On
the one hand, nothing in the theory predicts that legislatures will be abso-
lutely incapable of fairly representing minorities or that courts will always
fairly represent minorities; the Colorado case may simply be an example
of institutions acting counter to their usual predilection. On the other, the
legislature, though generally inferior to the courts in representing minor-
ity interests, may be the superior institution with respect to bilingual/
bicultural education but the inferior one with respect to equal employ-
ment opportunity. While new educational programs can be adopted at a
relatively low cost to any specific interest group, equal employment tends
to be a zero sum game between well-represented groups. 1 The latter situ-
ation greatly hinders legislative movement away from the status quo.
Whatever uncertainties are raised by the case studies about comparative
judicial and legislative capacities in representing minority interests, the
statistical survey strongly supports judicial capacity. Rebell and Block re-
port that fifty-six percent of the cases in their sample were brought by
minorities, who prevailed in seventy-one percent of their cases, whereas
other plaintiffs prevailed in only thirty-five percent of theirs. 2
27. Pp. 188, 190 (bill termed "revolutionary," "un-American").
28. Pp. 180-81. The key to getting anything done in our society (and probably any society) is
power and priority, access and clout. Success in the legislature may require what Eugene Bardach
calls the implementation "fixer." E. BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AF-
TER A BILL BECOMES A LAW 273-78 (1977). In the case of judges, the judicial office brings the
power, but judicial sympathy is needed for priority.
29. P. 192.
30. Pp. 182-85.
31. Interestingly, the Colorado legislation also contained provisions requiring affirmative action in
hiring. Relative to the total population of employees, however, the impact of such requirements would
have been minimal. In any case, the affirmative action requirement was softened in the final version
of the legislation. P. 190.
32. P. 36.
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The book's analysis of judicial methodology also shows the capacity of
courts to represent out-groups. Rebell and Block make much of the adher-
ence of courts to "principle" over "policy." Principle is "[a] statement es-
tablishing a right of an individual against the state or against another
individual";"3 policy considers "the relative importance or desirability of
particular social goals, and/or the relative efficiency and desirability of
particular methods for achieving such goals."' 34 Although Rebell and
Block attempt to use the idea of principle to rescue courts from the forbid-
den political act of preferring one policy over another, the authors finally
concede that a principle might be simply a policy judgment reached by a
higher court, or a new democratic value expressing itself in the form of
litigation.3 5 Legal realists are thus confirmed in their suspicion that a
principle is a policy endowed with judicial priority and called a "right";
the formalistic distinction between policy and principle is untenable.
Comparative institutionalism, which converts politics directly into doc-
trine, provides a coherent explanation. If minorities require better repre-
sentation, a doctrine of "better minority representation," commonly called
the doctrine of suspect classification, is appropriate. Thus, stripped of
mystifying formalism, references by courts in these cases to principles or
rights may safely be understood as references to minority rights. When
courts enforce rights, they are giving one particular interest preeminent
consideration.
It is, therefore, some reflection of the willingness of courts to take seri-
ously the claims of minorities and non-conformists that ninety-seven per-
cent of the cases involved principle or principle/policy balancing."6 Even
more clearly, the refusal to recognize the presence of a principle is a kiss
33. P. 23.
34. P. 24.
35. The authors note:
Our conclusion that district court judges generally tread cautiously in policy-oriented cases and
maintain a reasonably workable principle/policy distinction in applying constitutional and
statutory standards is not, of course, a complete answer to those who do not agree on the
content of these standards, and who believe that the principles announced in such major deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court as Tinker, Goss, and Lau were themselves too broad
and usurped the prerogatives of school boards or legislators. An immediate answer to this
position is that when courts are properly operating within the sphere of principle as defined by
the Supreme Court, the institution of American government that has been acknowledged (at
least since Marbury v. Madison) to have the responsibility for determining ultimate constitu-
tional principles, they cannot be said to be violating separation-of-powers limitations or to have
usurped policy roles of other branches. Beyond this doctrinal answer, however, we believe that
an important consideration, which is not often recognized in the discussions of legitimacy, is
that much of the increased judicial activity in social policy areas appears to stem from a dra-
matic increase in the number of substantial "principle" claims brought to the courts, rather
than to a shift in judicial orientation from the traditional concentration on "principle" issues
toward a new willingness to consider cases based on "policy" claims.
Pp. 201-02 (footnotes omitted).
36. P. 25.
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of death: "Defendant school boards won 100% of seven cases [in] which
courts characterized [plaintiffs' claims] as based on policy . . . ., If a
policy has priority, it is a principle. Principle, or right, is the language of
judicially preferred policies, and judges prefer policies when the policies
are legislatively underrepresented.
B. Finding Flaws in the Legislative Process: The Window of Judicial
Fact Finding
Not being representative institutions, courts cannot determine flaws in
the representational process from first-hand experience. Consequently,
comparative institutional advantage suggests the need for a method by
which courts can recognize the existence of legislative bias. The willing-
ness of a minority or non-conformist to sue is hardly sufficient. The book
suggests the importance of a solid, factual record as the primary method
for verifying legislative bias. Rebell and Block refer repeatedly to a find-
ing that, contrary to the critique of judicial activism, courts are impres-
sively capable fact gatherers while legislatures are more interested in voter
preferences than in analytically developed facts." Facts, it would seem,
are the judicial window on the world, an obvious substitute for represen-
tative feedback.
In the New York equal employment litigation (Chance), for example,
extensive proof showed the unfavorable effect of the formal examination
system on the placements of minorities as educational administrators.39 In
contrast, the Colorado bilingual/bicultural litigation (Otero), which the
minorities lost, was plagued with confusion about every essential social
fact-the existing linguistic disabilities of the children, the contribution of
inferior public education to these disabilities, and the feasibility of bilin-
gual/bicultural education as a remedy.40
The good factual record apparently has a social and political back-
ground, however. The New York litigation was brought by experienced
counsel of the Legal Defense Fund and utilized the well-established
norms of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,"' itself one of the crowning
achievements of decades of social movement litigation over the legitimacy
of interpreting disparate impact as evidence of unlawful discrimination. In
addition, many of the essential facts were provided voluntarily by local
37. P. 31 (footnote omitted).
38. Pp. 114-15, 143-44, 194, 205-08. 1 tend to see politics and the so-called rational analytic
method as complements rather than competitors. See Yudof, Plato's Ideal and the Penersi' of Polit-
ics, 81 MICH. L. REv. 730, 742-44 (1983).
39. Pp. 87-89.
40. Pp. 156-68, 184.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976); see p. 264 n.33.
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school authorities highly sympathetic to the plaintiffs' claims, perhaps be-
cause of the effective representation of minorities in local educational
politics.42
The Colorado lawsuit presented the opposite situation. Inexperienced
counsel bungled the factual record at several points.43 The legal theory of
bilingual/bicultural education was novel,44 and the precedents were am-
biguous.45 The plaintiffs, as well as their public-interest advocates, had
not achieved local political legitimacy and representation; indeed, a defen-
sive and provincial government viewed them as "outsiders agitators. '4
8
I am suggesting that a solid factual record in social movement litigation
is largely the result of society's gradual recognition of the plausibility of
the claim and the relevance of certain facts. 7 We see here some of the
inherent conservatism48 of courts. The firm, factual record for an unortho-
dox pro-minority claim is the product of patient social movement advocacy
surviving the initial period of astonishment and proceeding to a series of
related judicial and legislative victories.
C. Lapse in Legislative Correction: The Conservative Judge
The federal judge in Otero, Fred Winner, is probably a good example
of "representational failure" in courts. Comparative institutionalism sug-
gests other explanations for the result-the poor factual record, novel mi-
nority claim, difficult judicial remedy-but the book claims that the judge
aggravated or even took advantage of problems instead of trying to solve
42. Pp. 79, 82, 91, 102, 113, 115.
43. Pp. 155, 161, 164-65.
44. Pp. 168-69.
45. Pp. 149, 151-53.
46. P. 149.
47. The Otero plaintiffs' attorneys seemed to agree:
The underlying problem, as the plaintiffs' attorneys defined it, was that neither Chicanos
nor Anglos realized the extent of the disparity between the educational achievements of the two
groups of students. No one understood that the school was responsible for this disparity and
that feasible methods existed to eradicate it. The plaintiffs saw the La Voz demands and the
Otero lawsuit as vehicles for educating people about the Chicano experience in District 51
schools. Despite the ultimate dismissal of their complaint, this educational purpose may well
have been achieved. The Daily Sentinel reported regularly and in detail the plaintiffs' argu-
ments, on one occasion even giving the school-by-school dropout statistics. One established,
politically moderate Chicano businessman decided to testify for the plaintiffs at the trial, indi-
cating that the plaintiffs' ideas were gaining broader support in the Chicano community. And,
at the close of the trial, the Daily Sentinel itself editorialized that no matter who won, the suit
had taught the community much about the importance of educating individuals, rather than
"cramming [all children] into a common Anglo mold."
P. 150 (footnotes omitted).
48. I use the words "conservative" or "conservatism" in this Review in the narrow sense of oppo-
sition to change and belief in the majoritarian status quo. Unfortunately, conservatism has richer
meanings. Some conservative positions, such as the preservation of community, are actually minority
positions politically in spite of being "old fashioned." But "conservative" seems closer to my meaning
than "reactionary," which I used in previous drafts.
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them. Therefore, because of the judge's own conduct, it is impossible to
determine if the case was rightly decided from a comparative institutional
perspective.
Judge Winner was known to be "a conservative on civil rights cases,""
a reputation that the trial suggested was richly earned. He tipped his
hand early about his preference for the more restrictive of the prece-
dents,50 then sat back passively while a bewildering evidentiary standoff
developed between antagonistic parties.51 Pro-minority activism is perhaps
too much to expect from a judge who thinks that "school personnel should
. . . be awarded combat pay" for dealing with lawsuits, that "statutes and
procedures established to provide equal opportunity are subject to abuse
by minority complainants who are seeking not merely equal rights but
special advantages,"52 and who warned in a published opinion that an-
tidiscrimination statutes could be used as "a means of coercion" against
employers.53
More instructive is the subtle campaign of opposition that a judge can
wage because of his power over the details of trial proceedings. Judge
Winner sat back smugly while evidentiary chaos developed; in Chance,
Judge Mansfield took the lead in developing the facts." In the test results
introduced for the defense by the imperturbable Dr. Gene Glass5 to show
that Chicanos performed less well than Anglos because of lower socioeco-
nomic status and intelligence,5" the judge could see only "minor technical
criticisms."' 57 On the effectiveness of bilingual/bicultural education, how-
ever, he came out of his skeptical and quiescent shell to call the evidence
"illogical, unbelievable, and unacceptable."5 " By selecting key points at
which to be active or passive, a judge can make a large difference with
relatively little effort, especially given inexperienced plaintiffs' counsel.5
Unquestionably one of the greatest contributions of this book is bring-
ing our images of courts and legislatures closer together. Dedicated legis-
lators can give minority issues the combination of power and priority tra-
ditionally associated with courts. Antagonistic judges can squelch minority
49. P. 155.
50. Id.
51. Pp. 154-55, 172, 206.





57. Pp. 161, 287 n.65.
58. P. 167.
59. Obviously frustrated with the Otero trial, Rebell and Block design their own trial strategies at
several points. See, e.g., pp. 164-65 (proposing written counteranalysis of Glass report); p. 161 (sug-
gesting how plaintiffs could have easily impeached defendants' proof of children's English proficiency
and lack of Spanish proficiency).
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claims simply by being obstinate. And, of course, the social philosophy of
both legislators and judges is ultimately responsive to the representative
process. Our received image from Warren Court days is that of a liberal
federal judiciary courageously facing intransigent southern democracies.
The real world also contains conservative federal judges sitting in states
where successful Chicano politicians get a sympathetic hearing from their
brethren in sunbelt legislatures.60
II. JUDICIAL CORRECTION: PRESERVING THE COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE BY INCORPORATING PROXY POLITICS
A. A Variety of Techniques
Much of the critique of judicial activism is inconsistent."1 For example,
courts are criticized for being insufficiently representative when they act
in the traditional, insulated bipolar fashion 2 and "too political" when
they bring the wider community into the courtroom and resort to negotia-
tion rather than formal law to settle disputes.6" A theory of comparative
institutional advantage is not so confused. Although a court may take an
issue from the legislature in order to correct a specific bias, representative
capacities of legislatures deficient in one respect may be a great asset with
respect to other parts of the same case. Public law litigation"' especially
tends to bring many issues into the courtroom along with the fates of the
underrepresented plaintiffs.65 To the extent that political representation is
lost on the former issues, the comparative advantage of courts is also di-
minished. Thus, a theory of comparative institutional advantage has un-
ambiguous advice on this subject: Courts should attempt to incorporate the
60. Apparently even a sunbelt state is not a single "world." The judicial and legislative proceed-
ings in Colorado seemed to occur in total isolation from each other. P. 175.
61. See Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions ofJohn Hart Ely to Constitu-
tional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1037-38 (1980).
62. Pp. 9-10.
63. See, e.g., Berns, supra note 2, at 49, 51-52, 82-83 & n.116; Easterbrook, Substance and Due
Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85, 125; Kurland, Earl Warren: Master of the Revels, 96 HARv. L.
REv. 331, 339 (1982). The recommended escape from politics is an emphasis on principle. See supra
pp. 768-69. For a more sociological view, see Kirp & Babcock, Judge and Company: Court-
Appointed Masters, School Desegregation, and Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. Rav. 313, 318,
395-96 (1981).
64. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976) (describing fundamental characteristics of public law litigation); Eisenberg & Yeazell,
The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980) (well
established, but politically uncontroversial commercial litigation has some characteristics of public law
litigation); Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183 (1982) (describing inter-
est representation in public law litigation); Note, Implemnentation Problems in Institutional Reform
Litigation, 91 HARv. L. REV. 428 (1977) (dispute resolution at remedial stage).
65. See p. 113; Clune, Serrano & Robinson, Studies in the Implementation of Fiscal Equity and
Effective Education in State Public Law Litigation, in 2 SCHOOLS AND THE COURTS 67, 69 (P. Piele
ed. 1979) ("During the Robinson litigation, over thirty parties in interest or amid came before the
court.").
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political process, or a proxy for it, in every aspect of a case for which
there is no legislative bias. 6 Rebell and Block give us many examples in
which the courts simulate political processes through techniques of broad
representation and negotiation.
Chance is a good example of a case involving a core of minority rights
surrounded by a periphery of essentially political problems. Minority
plaintiffs were seeking a means of employment testing that would give
them more representation among school administrators, especially in
schools in their own communities. There were many other objectives, es-
sentially unrelated, that would have to be accommodated in the overall
plan. One important issue concerned the distribution of authority among
the Board of Examiners, the New York City School Board, and the com-
munity school boards.67 If a job performance standard were substituted for
paper-and-pencil tests, for example, who would do the evaluation? What
blend of meritocratic evaluation and political control should be chosen,
and at what level of government, 8 given that various blends produced an
acceptable representation of minorities? How should employees "bumped"
by a new personnel system be treated? Would there, for example, be in-
terdistrict bumping?"9
The Chance court answered these questions with an extraordinary
blend of measures for increasing political participation. Two separate ad-
visory bodies were created: a Task Force to produce a negotiated settle-
ment and an Advisory Council to advise the Chancellor of the New York
City Schools, both staffed with members from a range of interest groups.
The Task Force was created more or less spontaneously, in order to sat-
isfy Judge Mansfield's demand for a negotiated settlement. Judge Mans-
field issued preliminary orders that disrupted the status quo, creating a
climate conducive to negotiations, but he expressed the greatest reluctance
to enter a final judgment.
0
The Advisory Council established procedures for handling appoint-
66. The judicial-legislative dynamic is often complicated:
Public law litigation typically falls into a pattern of a series of judicial decrees followed by
government responses; Serrano was no exception. Three successive school finance provisions
were involved . . . . The process of litigation and legislative response surrounding Robinson is
somewhat more complicated than that surrounding Serrano since it involves three statutes, one
trial court opinion, and seven supreme court decisions.
Clune, supra note 65, at 77, 85.
67. Pp. 92-100. The federal court had to decide whether the new procedures satisfied the New
York State Constitution. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 561 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[A]
federal court which is shaping a remedy for constitutional violations should, other things being equal,
choose among alternatives the one which is consistent with state law."). On whether other things were
equal, see ifra note 86.
68. P. 106. At one point in the litigation, for example, a question arose about favoritism being
exercised by local boards.
69. P. 97.
70. P. 102.
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ments on an interim basis, while the Task Force developed plans for both
temporary and permanent licensing.7 1 One of the ironies of Chance was
that, because of formalistic reversals of trial court actions in the Second
Circuit, the supposedly "interim" administrative measures adopted by the
Advisory Council (known as Circular 30) became the status quo during
the long, unpredictable litigation.
72
On the basis of their case studies of the legislative and judicial processes
in New York and Colorado, the authors conclude that broad-based politi-
cal participation is just as common in courts as in legislatures:
In other words, in neither state did the forum determine the extent
of party polarity. Rather, participation seemed to be determined by
the willingness of certain groups to take a public stand in areas of
intense controversy (involving, in these instances, highly charged ra-
cial and ethnic issues). . . .Pending further empirical research, we
would tentatively conclude that the assumption that the relatively
narrow party representation in some public policy cases stems from
inherent limitations of the judicial process may be overemphasizing
institutional factors and minimizing consistent patterns of public be-
havior by the groups interested in the underlying controversies.78
The pattern of participation and negotiation detailed in the Chance case
study is strongly supported by the aggregate data. Of the sample of sixty-
five cases, fifty-seven percent involved multiple participants. Political pat-
terns at the remedy stage are even more interesting. First, judges have a
strong penchant for the least intrusive remedy; self-executing injunctions
and declaratory judgments are more common in these cases than reform
decrees requiring continued judicial involvement.7 Second, in thirteen of
the fifteen reform decree cases, one of three kinds of political participation
played a significant role in formulating the decree: authoritative legislative
or executive enactments, primary drafting of the remedial plan by the de-
fendants or by combinations of parties, and negotiated relief.75 Lastly, as a
means of enforcing decrees, courts strongly prefer less intrusive mecha-
nisms, such as retention of jurisdiction and the setting of reporting re-
quirements, to the more intrusive remedies involving discovery orders.
7 6 If
forced to use remedial discovery, courts use devices like panels to obtain
71. Pp. 101-02, 104-07.
72. Perhaps the theory of comparative institutional advantage should reckon with bureaucracies as
a stabilizing, routinizing influence. See Clune & Lindquist, What "Implementation" Isn't: Toward a
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political participation."
Even the supposedly prosaic process of finding facts shows judges as
crafty politicians. Rather than deciding facts directly on the basis of evi-
dence, courts just as often resort to "avoidance devices" which, in effect,
defer to some other part of the political process. Deference might be to a
legislature or to a higher court (excluding certain evidence as a matter of
law or imposing some burden of proof), to the parties (accepting as
"facts" dubious but uncontested statistics), or to the larger political
process.78
B. Lapse of Political Representation: The Snares of Formalism
One's admiration for the political skills of judges may extend so far that
the only embarrassing moments, from the perspective of the admirer, seem
to result from awkward fits of impractical formalism. The Chance litiga-
tion was repeatedly disrupted by bone-headed legalisms and refusals to
acknowledge political realities. Judge Tyler at one point persuaded him-
self that he could not consider the "best" solution to a problem but should
instead resolve the dispute by a metaphysical exegesis of some vague
words in the final judgment. 9 At another point, the same judge first re-
fused to do anything "political";80 then, when he decided to act, he
overcompensated by drafting the whole remedial plan himself, rather than
relying on the defendants as most courts do in similar situations.8' Just as
we were taught in law school, the law is either there, controlling every-
thing, or it is not there at all.82
But the grand prize for formalism goes to the Second Circuit, which
snatched defeat from the jaws of victory and nullified years of delicate
negotiations on the strength of two legalistic trip wires strung under the
feet of the trial judges. Labeling affirmative action "reverse discrimina-
tion," the court of appeals suggested an alternative concept reeking of for-
malistic antiquity: the idea of "constructive seniority."83 The more serious
blunder of the appeals court terminated federal jurisdiction. Suffering per-
haps from an institutional loss of memory, the court decided that since the
lingering disagreements between the Board of Examiners and the Board
77. Pp. 64-65.
78. For example, courts have accepted a defendant school board's equity-oriented fiscal realloca-
tions as an "admission" about the importance of money in education and have accepted a legislative
determination that individualized identification of learning-disabled children was necessary for an ap-




82. See Clark & Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Coyn mon
Lau' Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 264-76 (1961).
83. P. 97.
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of Education about the details of an appropriate examination process were
now all that was left of the case, there was no federal question and juris-
diction should be terminated!"4 Of course, having lost their federal right
just one remedial detail short of a significant victory, the plaintiffs eventu-
ally came back to federal court after also beginning a state court action. 85
The Second Circuit was apparently less than instructive about why a dis-
agreement between two of the defendants over how to satisfy a federal
right should impair the right itself."'
CONCLUSION
The neoconservative and neoliberal critiques of judicial activism,
7
which this book was designed to evaluate, emerge from it in shreds. At the
level explicitly tested by the authors, courts emerge as faithful to "princi-
ple" (policies given priority by law), expert as fact finders, adroit at polit-
ical representation, and effective and diplomatic in fashioning and enforc-
ing their decrees.
From the perspective of comparative institutional advantage, courts dis-
charge the task of compensating for flaws in the democratic process in a
highly responsible manner. Indeed, the only failings of courts documented
by the book are sins of passivism rather than activism. Judge Winner's
trial of the Colorado bilingual/bicultural lawsuit seems to be an example
of a judge's reinforcing flaws in the majoritarian process instead of com-
pensating for them. The other passive failings are vices of formalism. In
the New York litigation, having successfully gotten the parties to the point
that they were willing to accept a compromise more favorable to racial
minorities than the status quo, the courts paradoxically abandoned the
project because it had become too "political."
At an even deeper positive level-where we see in this book the sociol-
ogy of social change in courts and legislatures-the idea of excessive judi-
84. Pp. 100-01.
85. Pp. 120-22.
86. Beneath all the doctrine, the sympathies of the court apparently ran in three directions. First,
the court seemed annoyed that the Board of Examiners had been reduced to a minor role. Chance v.
Board of Examiners, 561 F.2d 1079, 1084 (2d Cir. 1977). Second, the court seemed to favor testing as
a sign of merit. Id. at 1088, 1090. Finally, the court appeared to be opposed to affirmative action.
Compare id. at 1087 (discussing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)) with Chance v. Board of
Examiners, 534 F.2d 993, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding "reverse discrimination"). This final bias
of the court suggests that some formalism is simply conservative politics in disguise. See also supra
note 67 (asserted reliance on state constitution).
87. Purist liberals and conservatives define themselves in terms of philosophical or ideological
positions on the appropriateness of governmental action. Neoconservatives and neoliberals define their
opposition to governmental intervention in terms of cost consciousness and of disillusionment over the
results and realistic potential of ambitious social programs. See Goodman, Iming Kristol: Patron
Saint of the New Right, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at 90; Hitchens, Minority Report,
237 NATION 422 (1983); Lekachman, Book Review, 237 NATION 408 (1983).
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cial activism or judicial tyranny emerges for what it truly is: conservative
rhetoric designed to discredit small gains by minorities before they become
too costly to the interests of the status quo. Remarks by Dr. Kenneth
Clark along similar lines once made me uneasy."8 But this book, along
with close study of the details of so-called judicial activism in almost any
context, cries out for such a verdict. The book sees courts as extremely
cautious institutions. They do not stand in the vanguard of social change,
but rather wait until social movements have achieved a high degree of
legitimacy.89 Decades after the first shocking demonstrations and state re-
taliations, when social movements have gained much recognition in cul-
ture and in law, courts step carefully forward. Even then, the factual re-
cord must be good and the court will probe and probe for a diplomatic,
politic, negotiated solution. "Judicial activism" sounds credible because
the status quo seems reasonable.
We must conclude from this book, in light of comparative institutional
analysis and social change theory, that judicial activism is both safe and
democratic. However, although the conservative judicial position is clearly
discredited, nothing can specify the proper degree of judicial activism.
Rebell and Block suggest at the end of the book that both courts and
legislatures have the greatest difficulty in situations of "confrontational"
social change and the greatest success in a cooperative milieu.90 Compara-
tive institutional analysis would accept this proposition as identifying the
range of judicial capacity. A court can handle only so much resistance and
sabotage from the other political branches. From a social change perspec-
tive, as the social legitimacy of a minority group increases, the majority's
mistreatment of the minority becomes more obvious, leading to greater
judicial mistrust of the majoritarian process. At the same time, resistance
to any pro-minority judicial decree declines.91 Thus, the potentially far-
reaching judicial capacity to "give voice to the voiceless" is dampened by
competing elements of social consciousness, prudence and expediency.
Any way we look at it, then, courts can be effective on behalf of minori-
88. Dr. Clark spoke at a meeting sponsored by the National Institute of Education, February
17-18, 1976. See Clark, Social Science, Constitutional Rights and the Courts, in EDUCATION, SOCIAL
SCIENCE AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 1, 3 (R. Rist & R. Anson eds. 1976) (discussing "neoliberal
revisionism").
89. See Clune, A Political Model of Inplementation And Implications of the Model for Research,
Public Policy, and the Changing Roles of Law and Lau'ers, 69 IowA L. REv. 47, 87-93 (1983). I
follow the theory of law and social change which says, in very simple terms, that the law generally
gets positioned somewhere between contending social forces. See also Clune & Hyde, Final Offer
Interest Arbitration in Wisconsin: Legislative History, Participant Attitudes, Future Trends, 64
MARQ. L. REv. 455 (1981) (describing instability of purely procedural solution to fundamental sub-
stantive conflict).
90. Pp. 213-14.
91. One might consider Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), in this light.
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ties only when the minority position gains some social credibility outside
the courtroom. Courts can help a minority group if it is not too minor.
Courts are capable of playing a role in progressive but not radical change.
This should calm the fears of anyone with a vision of runaway, subversive
activism and suggest to radicals that a transformation of society will re-
quire something considerably more than constitutional law and
litigation."2
92. This is what I take to be the general point of Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694
(1980).
